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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—ALL (FOOD) POLITICS IS LOCAL:
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM, NEW ENGLAND SMALL FARMS, AND THE
FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT
The family farm: it is way up there next to God and country, close to
baseball and motherhood. . . . Family farming belongs to our secular
1
theology.
Successive iterations of federal farm policy designed to maximize
production have driven the romanticized Jeffersonian idea of the
family farmer to the brink of extinction.2

INTRODUCTION
Gary Gemme and Davey Wojciechowski have been business
partners since 1979 when they began farming eight acres (with one
greenhouse) in Whately, Massachusetts.3 Since that time, their business,
Harvest Farm, has grown and expanded to occupy over one hundred
acres; Davey runs the greenhouses and Gary oversees the field
production.4 They grow a variety of crops including vegetable and
flower seedlings for sale on the wholesale market.5 Each day, Gary is
able to oversee the work of field production, including harvest and postharvest.6 In New England, it is very common for those who own farms
to be involved as operators and be engaged directly in every aspect of
the farm’s production.7

1. RONALD JAGER, THE FATE OF FAMILY FARMING: VARIATIONS ON AN AMERICAN
IDEA viii (2004).
2. Nicholas R. Johnson & A. Bryan Endres, Small Producers, Big Hurdles: Barriers
Facing Producers of “Local Foods,” 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 49, 49 (2012).
3. History of Harvest Farm of Whately, HARVEST FARM OF WHATELY, MASS.,
http://www.harvestfarmofwhately.com/history.html (last visited May 22, 2015).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Id.
7. According to Mr. Gemme, “a small farm is of a size that allows the farmer the ability
to closely inspect all of its crops in a given day . . . [and] manag[e] all aspects of the
production operation and wor[k] directly with the labor force in the harvest and post-harvest
processes, as well as the sales and shipping of the produce. This describes most farms in New
England.” Gary Gemme, Gary Gemme: Food-Safety Rules a Threat to Small New England
Farms, DAILY HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE (Northampton, Mass.), Aug. 20, 2013, available at
http://www.gazettenet.com/home/8122078-95/gary-gemme-food-safety-rules-a-threat-to337
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Despite a successful business model, long days on the farm, owner
involvement and oversight of production at every level, and adoption of
a consumer-based safety compliance program, Harvest Farm may cease
to exist because the cost of compliance with new regulations could be
preclusive.8
New federal food safety regulations will be fully
implemented within the next few years,9 and because Harvest Farm will
likely fall outside of any exemption, it could become a fatality of the
Food Safety Modernization Act (“FSMA”).
In late 2010, Congress passed the FSMA, the first overhaul of food
safety regulation in nearly seventy years.10 A variety of sweeping
foodborne illnesses caused consumers and legislators alike to demand
government action to ensure consumer safety.11 Because several of the
outbreaks stemmed from and were traced back to mainly industrial
farming operations, agriculture – as an industry – was viewed as a part of
the potential problem that required further oversight and regulation.12
small-new-england-farms. Mr. Gemme bases his opinions on his forty years of experience as
a New England farmer. Id.
8. Mr. Gemme has further written that “these new regulations would force even smallscale growers such as myself to expend very limited financial and labor resources (in many
cases beyond their means) in order to comply with the program.” Id. Much of the discussion
herein examines the potential impact under the FDA’s initial set of proposed regulations.
After significant outcry from farmers like Gemme, the FDA has since revised certain
provisions. See FSMA Proposed Rule for Produce Safety, Standards for the Growing,
Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption, available at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm334114.htm. This author contends
that the underlying legislation will inevitably fail to create a fully workable system.
9. The implementation of multiple provisions of the FSMA have been continuously
delayed, due in part to the government shutdown of late 2013 and also due to FDA concern
regarding impacts on stakeholders to be affected across a vast realm of food producers and
farmers. Ricardo Carvajal, In Litigation, FDA Explains and Defends FSMA Efforts, FDA
LAW BLOG, (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/
12/in-litigation-fda-explains-and-defends-fsma-efforts.html. The FDA has agreed to set 2015
as the year in which the proposed rules must be finalized. See Center for Food Safety v.
Hamburg, 954 F.Supp.2d 965 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Center for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. C
12-4529 PJH (N. D. Cal. 2013) (order granting injunctive relief), available at
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/fsma-remedy-order_52466.pdf.
10. The FSMA “overhaul[s] the nation’s food safety laws for the first time since the
Great Depression.” Debra M. Strauss, An Analysis of the FDA Food Safety Modernization
Act: Protection for Consumers and Boon for Business, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 353, 354 (2011).
11. For example, a peanut butter outbreak in 2009 infected over seven hundred
individuals with a strain of Salmonella; in 2006, tomatoes contaminated with a strain of
Salmonella sickened over one hundred eighty individuals across twenty-one states and in
2006, bagged spinach contaminated with E. coli killed three and sickened nearly two hundred
others. See generally, List of Selected Multistate Foodborne Outbreak Investigations, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, available at http://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/
outbreaks/multistate-outbreaks/outbreaks-list.html (providing a chronological detailed listing
of recent foodborne illness outbreaks).
12. Overview and Background: What is the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA)?,
NAT’L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COALITION, available at
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Federal regulation of agricultural activities has developed vis-à-vis
the historical movement away from a society in which smaller agrarian
pursuits have given way to a growth of a much more industrialized,
national market.13 Regulation has been responsive to the various
realities of such industrialization—as small family farms became fewer
and further between, federal regulation responded to the proliferation
and centralization of larger players.14
The FSMA, despite a well-intentioned exemption for “small”
farmers and producers,15 merely pays lip service to the notion that
retaining small agricultural entities is a worthy goal. Congress variously
directs the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to make subsequent
regulations workable for smaller entities, but does little else to guide or
control the development.16 Numerous individuals have criticized
http://sustainableagriculture.net/fsma/overview-and-background/ (last visited May 22, 2015)
(“Due to a rise in major outbreaks of foodborne illnesses and increasing bioterrorism concerns
after 9/11, both Congress and the Obama Administration proposed new food safety measures
in 2009 that expanded food safety regulations to the farm level.”).
13. See Peter Anderson, Comment, Empowering Local and Sustainable Food: Does the
Food Safety Modernization Act’s Tester-Hagan Amendment Remove Enough Barriers?, 9 J.L
ECON. & POL’Y 145, 152-55 (2012) (describing briefly the vast changes to the American
agriculture sector since the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s inception as a federal agency in
1862); See also Neal D. Fortin, The Hang-Up with HACCP: The Resistance to Translating
Science into Food Safety Law, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 565, 565 (2003) (concluding that
regulation attempts to address rapid changes in science and business, including centralization
of the food industry.).
14. Anderson, supra note 13, at 152. “[I]n 1862, 48% of Americans lived on farms. By
2000, only 1% of Americans lived on farms. In the interim, the U.S. food economy has
shifted towards specialization and globalization driven by new technologies. Only recently
has the food economy shown some signs of ‘relocalization.’” Anderson, supra note 13 at 152.
15. The Tester-Hagan Amendment to the FSMA was included after many small and
mid-sized farmers and producers decried the FSMA’s blanket regulation. See, e.g., Action
Alert: Protect Small Farmers and Food Producers from FSMA Regulations, FARM AND
RANCH FREEDOM ALLIANCE, (Nov. 5, 2014), available at
http://farmandranchfreedom.org/alert-protect-small-farmers-from-fsma-regulations/ (“We
fought hard for the Tester-Hagan amendment to exempt small-scale, direct-marketing farms
and artisan food producers from the most burdensome aspects of the Food Safety
Modernization Act (FSMA). This exemption is essential to the continued vitality of the local
foods movement.”). “Small” seems to have a subjective definition; frequently, it relies on
gross income produced; however, small can also be defined by acreage or owner involvement
in the operation, or some combination of these factors. See, e.g., Helen Dombalis, Tester—
Now More Than Ever, NAT’L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COALITION, (Aug. 23, 2011),
http://sustainableagriculture.net/blog/tester-now-more-than-ever/ (“NSAC supported the
Tester-Hagan amendment and advocated for its inclusion in the final legislation, for the very
reason that it allows smaller farms that sell products locally to play to their natural strengths in
terms of food safety.”). In effect, however, the Tester-Hagan Amendment functions more as a
limit than a loophole by placing stringent caps based on revenue and average locality of sales.
The exemption provisions at issue are codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350h(f) (2012) and 21 U.S.C. §
350g (2012).
16. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 305h(a)(3)(A) (2012) (directing that the rulemaking shall
“provide sufficient flexibility to be applicable to various types of entities engaged in the
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Congress, the FDA, and interested parties for a lack of creativity in
developing a workable food safety regulatory system.17 The FSMA
grants the FDA broad authority to develop a plethora of regulations with
the further directive that the FDA define very small businesses;18
however, the very parameters of the Tester-Hagan Amendment
delineating a basic rubric for the exemption framework illustrate a
congressional tendency to view agriculture with no eye toward the
intricacies that occur within the occupation.19
The Tester-Hagan amendment creates exemptions from two rules:
the Produce Rule and the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
(HACCP) Rule.20 In both instances, the exemption is available or
partially available to entities with a gross income from sales of food less
than $500,000 and, additionally, the farm or facility must sell more than
fifty percent of the food products directly to a qualified end user in the
same state or within 275 miles of the facility.21

production and harvesting of fruits and vegetables that are raw agricultural commodities,
including small businesses and entities that sell directly to consumers, and be appropriate to
the scale and diversity of the production and harvesting of such commodities”).
17. See, e.g., Helena Bottemiller, Merrigan Expresses Worry About FSMA’s Impact on
Agriculture, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May 24, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/05/
merrigan-expresses-worry-about-fsmas-impact-to-agriculture/# (Kathleen Merrigan, former
Deputy U.S. Secretary of Agriculture has stated that she is “worr[ied] about the bureaucracy
not always being as creative as they might be in achieving the same level of food safety at
small and medium size operations”). Some have posited that the agendas of large-scale
agricultural actors are actually aligned with the FSMA’s burdensome mandates:
Corporations depend on a global supply chain, and in doing so they are finding it
increasingly difficult to deliver safe food. At the same time, they are losing
market share to the local food systems that customers are demanding—witness
the sharp increase in farmers markets, community—supported agriculture
(CSAs), and restaurants offering “farm to fork” menus. To avoid legal liability,
the corporations want to legitimize an industrial approach to sterilizing
everything, without regard to the unnecessary and costly burden placed on local
farmers. If your local farmer goes out of business trying to comply with the costs
of hundreds of pages of new federal food safety regulations, well that just leaves
more customers without a local alternative.
Michael Tabor & Nick Maravell, Farm Markets Threatened by Food Safety Efforts,
LANCASTER FARMING, N. EDITION, Aug. 17, 2013, at A9, available at
http://lfg.live.mediaspanonline.com/assets/9751540/A09LFWE-081713_1.pdf.
18. 21 U.S.C. § 350g(1)(B)(i) (2012).
19. Mark Kastel, co-Founder of the Cornucopia Institute, commented that “[w]e are
really talking about two parallel food production and distribution systems in this country. One
is inherently dangerous due to its scale, methodology, and distribution model. The other
depends on an intimate relationship between modest, local/regional owner operators. . . .” ,
Will the Tester Amendment to S.510 help small farms and processors, put more kids at risk?,
FOOD FIGHT, (Nov. 17, 2010), http://grist.org/article/food-2010-11-16-tester-amendment-to-s510-help-small-farms/.
20. See 21 U.S.C. § 350h(f) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 350g (2012).
21. See 21 U.S.C. § 350h(f) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 350g (2012).
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Thus, there are several factors in determining whether an entity is
exempt; however, arguably, there exist small and mid-sized farmers and
producers who will not qualify in whole or in part. Additionally, the
statutory requirement for FDA development of Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (HACCP) regulations22 falsely assumes that
regulated entities will be able to absorb what have historically been high
costs associated with similar types of preventive measures implemented
elsewhere.23
Nationwide, there has been a growth in new-entry farmers and an
increased interest in small-scale sustainable and organic agriculture.24 In
New England, states are experiencing the effects of attempts at creating
and bolstering local food economies through new farms, farmland
preservation, and farmland tenure.25 Small, sustainable, organic farms
dedicated to invigorating local food systems are a growing trend, readily
apparent in New England.26 Consumers seek out locally-grown and
produced items for a variety of reasons including perception of increased
healthiness and freshness of product, inherent safety of the product, and
a more direct form of accountability.27 Supporting smaller, locally-based

22. 21 U.S.C. § 350g (2012).
23. See, e.g., Fortin, supra note 13, at 565 (stating that the most common grounds for
opposition to HACCP preventive measures is cost).
24. See, e.g., Dan Charles, Who Are the Young Farmers of Generation Organic?, NPR,
Dec. 12, 2011, available at http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2011/12/12/143459793/who-arethe-young-farmers-of-generation-organic (“[T]here’s a new surge of youthful vigor into
American agriculture — at least in the corner of it devoted to organic, local food. Thousands
of young people who’ve never farmed before are trying it out . . . [T]he overwhelming
majority of [new] farmers . . . want to farm without chemical fertilizers or pesticides.”).
25. Various organizations are dedicated to preservation of small-scale agriculture in
New England. See, e.g., FOREVER FARMLAND, http://foreverfarmland.org/ (last visited May
22, 2015) (dedicated to preserving agricultural parcels in western Massachusetts through
agricultural preservation restrictions); LAND FOR GOOD, http://www.landforgood.org (last
visited May 22, 2015) (“Entire communities will benefit from increased farming opportunity,
healthy lands and a more secure food supply.”); GROW FOOD NORTHAMPTON, Our Mission,
Goals, and Beliefs, http://www.growfoodnorthampton.com/about-us-2/our-mission/ (last
visited May 22, 2015) (“We believe that successful agriculture looks to the past and the future:
it studies lessons from our farming history, embraces new research into sustainable practices,
critically examines current agricultural paradigms, and fosters farm-based and food-based
learning in the entire community.”).
26. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE/NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS SERVICE, NEW ENGLAND FIELD OFFICE, Trends in New England Agriculture
2002-2007, available at http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics_by_State/New_England/
Publications/Presentations_and_Displays/TrendsinNewEnglandAgriculture.ppt
(New England has experienced a growth spurt in organic agriculture, direct-market sales, and
marketing through Community Supported Agriculture (CSA); this growth had outpaced the
rest of the country as of 2007).
27. JAMES T. O’REILLY, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO FOOD REGULATION & SAFETY, 113
(2010) (“Food is produced more carefully by actual farmers—persons who either sell at a
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farmers and producers infuses income into a local economy,28 and local
foods produced and grown sustainably create fewer adverse
environmental impacts by virtue of the limited distance shipped and
sustainable growing techniques.29 As a whole, New England has
historically and recently practiced a distinct type of agriculture.30
Regional considerations alter the realities of agriculture as an industry
across states and between regions;31 administering blanket regulations
and exemptions in the agricultural industry are inherently problematic.
New England agriculture—because of considerations such as
average level of on-farm diversification, weather, climate, costs of land
and operation, and increased consumer demand for organic, sustainablyproduced items32—is a stark example of how the FSMA will be
inadequately sensitive to regional and local agricultural considerations.
This insensitivity is especially obvious in the provision providing an
exemption for certain entities from the Produce Rule33 and the HACCP

farmer’s market or whose identities are known to repeat customers in their local
community.”).
28. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, Market Forces: Creating Jobs through Public
Investment in Local and Regional Food Systems, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/food_
and_agriculture/solutions/expand-healthy-food-access/market-forces.html (last visited May
22, 2015) (“[Local food] creates jobs, keeps money in local economies, promotes community
development, and can reduce the environmental and public health costs of the food we eat.”).
29. LOCAL HARVEST, Why Buy Local?, http://www.localharvest.org/buylocal.jsp, (last
visited May 22, 2015) (“Most produce in the US is picked 4 to 7 days before being placed on
supermarket shelves, and is shipped for an average of 1500 miles before being sold. “). See
also MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS
261 (2006) (“I don’t believe it’s sustainable . . . to FedEx meat all around the country.”)
Pollan further explains that there are “ethical implications” including the “expense [and]
prodigious amounts of energy involved, the defiance of seasonality . . . .” Id. See also
O’REILLY, supra note 27, at 113 (“Less energy is burned to move the crop from a distant area
to the local consumer.”).
30. NEW ENGLAND FARMERS UNION, FSMA and Structure of New England
Agriculture, www.newenglandfarmersunion.org/food-safety-modernization-act/fsma-andstructure-of-new-england-agriculture/ (last visited May 22, 2015) (“Because farms in New
England are relatively small and our costs of production are higher than many other regions,
we can expect to suffer more than our fair share of FSMA casualties.”).
31. Historically, FDA has concluded that because of the “diversity of agricultural
practices and commodities, practices recommended to minimize microbial contamination will
be most effective when adapted to specific operations.” U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, Guidance for Industry: Guide to Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards
for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables, 117 (Oct. 26, 1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/
GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/ProducePlanProducts/ucm06
5474.htm.
32. See, e.g., FAIR FOOD NETWORK, Growing Good Food Enterprises Through Impact
Investing, (Jan. 3, 2012), available at http://www.fairfoodnetwork.org/connect/blog/growinggood-food-enterprises-through-impact-investing (promoting investment in sustainable New
England farms in response to growing demand for local, sustainably produced food).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 350h (2012).
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Rule.34 It is problematic that many agricultural entities in New England
will fall outside of the exemption and will be driven out of business or
required to raise prices drastically because of the FSMA.35 In turn, small
to mid-sized owner-operated farms—especially those with the
heightened operating costs associated with sustainable and organic
agriculture—may disappear.36
Our food supply would become
37
inherently less safe as further centralization and industrialization of
agriculture would occur as larger businesses are able to more readily
absorb the costs of compliance.38
Blanket federal regulation of agriculture as an industry is
fundamentally problematic due to these regional and state
considerations. The FSMA, to the extent that it adequately addresses the
issue of food safety, should be implemented in a way that recognizes
each state’s agricultural realities. To this end, revisiting the theory of
cooperative federalism may prove insightful;39 such an approach in
implementation of a behemoth federal policy could be fruitful. The
tenets of cooperative federalism represent an advocacy for heightened
state and local involvement in implementation of federal policy
objectives.40 Over the past century, the concept of cooperative
federalism has been interpreted and defined in various ways,41 and has
most recently been associated with the national implementation of

34. 21 U.S.C. § 350g (2012).
35. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Analysis of Economic Impacts –
Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing and Holding of Produce for Human
Consumption, 317 (2013), available at www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/
UCM334116.pdf (“Small entities with above average costs of doing business will be at a
competitive disadvantage. Some small entities might determine that their new expected costs
are likely to exceed their revenues.”).
36. NEW ENGLAND FARMERS UNION, FSMA and Structure of New England
Agriculture, www.newenglandfarmersunion.org/food-safety-modernization-act/fsma-andstructure-of-new-england-agriculture/ (last visited May 22, 2015).
37. The FSMA will have a direct bearing on the issue of increasing food security,
especially for at-risk populations. Small and diversified farms function to provide an
important alternative to massive supply chains and the monocultures from which much of our
food stems.
38. NEW ENGLAND FARMERS UNION, supra note 36 (“FSMA favors larger scale
operations that will be able to absorb the costs of FSMA compliance because they can spread
the impact of the costs across more products.”).
39. Cooperative federalism is defined as “[d]istribution of power between the federal
government and the states in which each recognizes the powers of the other while jointly
engaging in certain governmental functions.” Federalism, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009).
40. See Symposium on Cooperative Federalism, Foreword, 23 IOWA L. REV. 455, 456
(1938).
41. Id. (cooperative federalism broadly defined as “the participation of several
governments in cooperative legislation or administrative action.”).
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federal natural resources and pollution control laws.42
The basic principles of cooperative federalism include a collective
approach to the implementation of laws—an approach in which state and
local interests have a shared role in creating and implementing policies.43
Rethinking and revisiting the tenets of cooperative federalism is a
potential solution in reaching the important end of preserving state and
regional autonomy in the face of overwhelming federal regulation such
as the FSMA.
A more cooperative approach to food safety may afford the
deference to states necessary to successful implementation of the FSMA.
The FSMA will not be effective if it eliminates small owner-operated
farms and producers; arguably, putting the smaller players out of
business may actually further the ongoing food safety problems most
often associated with large-scale industrial agriculture and food
production.
This Note will analyze the FSMA exemption framework for small
farmers and producers and the immense costs that compliance will place
on those who are unable to qualify for the exemptions. Additionally, it
will argue that New England, as a region, practices a distinct and
beneficial type of agriculture, illustrating the need for exemptions that
look beyond gross revenue caps and radial distances.
This Note will then argue that because the Tester-Hagan
Amendment falls short of protecting small farmers, the FSMA will act as
a disincentive to those wishing to practice small-scale sustainable
agriculture and, in effect, will only further subsidize the growth of
industrial agriculture, which is the main source of food safety concerns.
The argument portion of this Note will discuss potential solutions to
problems created by the FSMA and its insufficient exemptions,
including analysis of the tenets of cooperative federalism as a potential
means to address the necessity of regional and state considerations in
delineating exemptions.
I. FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY
This Section of the Note will briefly summarize the history of
federal regulation of food safety in the United States; the development of
a fragmented approach to food safety is contextually important to
42. See generally Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources
Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179 (2005) (providing historical and contemporary definitions
and conceptions of cooperative federalism).
43. Id. at 192 (“[N]otwithstanding the stringency floor . . . cooperative federalism
programs typically allow for significant customization of standards.”).
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understanding some of the futility of a wholly federal approach to food
safety. It will then discuss and analyze the depth and breadth of
regulation of agricultural entities under the FSMA, including the
provisions for partial or complete exemption from compliance for
“small” entities.
Next is an examination of the facets of agriculture and food
production in New England that render the region fundamentally
different from other regions and states. Such regional and state-specific
differences are an example of the inadequacy of the current federallybased approach. “[T]he definition of a small business, specifically with
respect to farms, is relative to the geographic region in which it is
located.”44 Because the notion of small should be particular to the
surrounding region, a blanket federal definition of what constitutes a
“small farm” is problematic.45
A. A History of Fragmentation and Duplication
The development of food safety regulation in the United States has
been described by scholars as a “patchwork quilt.”46 It has been
implemented as a result of “ad hoc decision making arising from
legislation designed to address the crisis du jour while appeasing an
organized and active commodity production system, rather than the
development of a comprehensive systematic program designed around
the production of safe, nutritious food.”47 In the early nineteenth
century, Congress formed various committees and subcommittees
centered on agriculture; interestingly, despite the fact that agriculture is
integral to the nation’s food supply, not one of the committees had a
hand in ensuring food safety.48 The U.S. Department of Agriculture and
the land-grant university system were established in 186249 and the
Hatch Act of 1887 allotted funding for agricultural research in

44. Nicholas Obolensky, The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011: Too Little, Too
Broad, Too Bad, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 887, 914 (2012).
45. Id.
46. A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, Integrating Stakeholder Roles in Food
Production, Marketing, and Safety Systems: An Evolving Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 26 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 29, 39 (2011).
47. Id.
48. Id. This is not to say that food safety was not an issue in the early 1800s;
interestingly, however, the percentage of individuals engaged in agrarian activities was
historically more significant than at present. “Between 1974 and 1997, the number of farms
with average sales over $500,000 increased just over 600% while the total number of farms
decreased approximately 17%.” Johnson and Endres, supra, note 2 at 51-52. In the 1800s,
long supply chains were simply not everyday realities.
49. Id. First Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862).
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connection with each state’s land-grant university.50 “[I]n light of the
jurisdiction of the congressional committees and the relatively localized
nature of food production and consumption, these institutions focused on
facilitating a system of agricultural production to feed the country’s
westward expansion and growing population, not the safety of the food
supply chain.”51 The U.S. Department of Agriculture has generally
focused its policies on efficient maximization of dependable production
of food.52
This focus “remained steadfast despite the lengthening of the food
supply system . . . and the potential for widespread food contamination
due to consolidation of processing and distribution in the supply
chain.”53 As demand for increased production grew, the theory of
successful agriculture centered on maximizing land use, despite
detriment to the environment.54 The focus on “increased per-acre yields”
additionally compromised integrity of the safety and nutrition of the end
product.55 The goal of increasing yields unfortunately places quality and
safety standards on the back burner. The only aspect of food safety over
which the U.S. Department of Agriculture retains jurisdiction is the
slaughter and processing of meat products56—this creates a problematic
bifurcation of power between the FDA and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture.57
The initial instance of federal food safety legislation was the Pure
Food Act of 1906,58 followed by the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.59 Although jurisdiction under these acts initially rested with the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, the FDA was transferred to the Federal
Security Agency in 1940 as part of President Roosevelt’s

50. Endres & Johnson, supra note 46, at 39; HATCH Act, ch. 314, 24 Stat. 440 (1887).
51. Endres & Johnson, supra note 46, at 40.
52. Id. at 44.
53. Id. at 40.
54. Id. at 40-41.
55. Id. at 40.
56. Id. at 41-42. (An apt example of the absurdity of this bifurcation of powers between
FDA and the USDA is that FDA’s food safety jurisdiction oversees the manufacture of frozen
cheese pizzas, while USDA oversees any pizzas with pepperoni.); Madaleine Drexler,
Foodborne Illness: Who Monitors Our Food? ,BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY SCHUSTER INSTITUTE
FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, https://www.brandeis.edu/investigate/foodhealth/foodborne-illness/who-monitors-food.html (last visited May 22, 2015).
57. Endres & Johnson, supra note 46, at 41-42.
58. Pure Food & Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (June 30, 1906) (repealed
1938).
59. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-379(f) (2006). The FSMA,
in effect, overhauls various portions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act pertaining to food
safety.
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“Reorganization Plan Number Four.”60 Food safety oversight expanded
to include a majority of food products; somewhat strangely, jurisdiction
over the slaughter and processing of meat and meat products remained
within the purview of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, creating a
peculiar split in authority.61 The FDA and the USDA remain the primary
agencies sharing the responsibility of food safety oversight.62 “The
result is a confused regulatory system in which different agencies
exercise jurisdiction over a product depending upon the stage in
production and the relative meat or poultry content in the end product.”63
In addition to USDA and FDA oversight, the Environmental
Protection Agency is tasked with overseeing the chemical aspects of
agriculture including chemical inputs such as pesticides, herbicides, and
fertilizers.64 “The result of this longstanding federal policy ‘is a
complicated, multi-agency system that is characterized by commandand-control regulations and jurisdictional silos.’ Today, fifteen agencies
are responsible for implementing thirty different statutes having to do
with food safety.”65 Despite the massive overhaul of the FDA’s power
brought about by the FSMA, demands for creation of a single food
safety agency increase.66
Against this background of multiple agency oversight, including
state agencies, as well as voluntary, consumer-driven food safety
programs, Congress reacted to consumer pressure in light of a growing
number of serious, frequently deadly, foodborne illness outbreaks.67
Constituent furor over the apparent inadequacy of food safety
protections grew after incidents such as the E. coli outbreak of 2006

60. See Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety
Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 84 n.131 (2000).
61. Endres & Johnson, supra note 46, at 42.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; Johnson & Endres, supra note 2 at 68 (“The fact is that the regulatory structure
surrounding our food production system is labyrinthine, confusing, duplicative, and often
bordering on draconian—and it applies to everyone.”).
65. Johnson & Endres, supra note 2, at 69.
66. “[The General Accountability Office] suggests Congress ask the National Academy
of Science to study organizational structures the U.S. government might use for its food safety
programs . . . . [including] a single food safety agency, either housed within an existing
agency or established as an independent entity, that assumes responsibility for all aspects of
food safety at the federal level.” Dan Flynn, GAO Report Calls for Single Food Safety
Agency, FOOD SAFETY NEWS, Mar. 2, 2011, available at http://www.foodsafetynews.com/
2011/03/call-for-one-food-safety-agency-leads-historic-gao-report/#.UnaeXiSw7CR.
67. Johnson & Endres, supra note 2 at 71-72 “The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention . . . has estimated that there are more than 38.4 million illnesses, 71,500
hospitalizations, and 1,600 deaths per year associated with foodborne illnesses in the United
States.” These statistics have, however, been criticized as inaccurate.
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traced to bagged spinach,68 the salmonella outbreak tentatively traced to
jalapeno peppers in 2008,69 and a severe salmonella outbreak traced to
peanut butter processing plants in Georgia in 2008-2009, which caused
at least nine deaths.70
The regulatory scheme of the FSMA is aimed at the historical bad
actors—namely, industrial agribusiness71—yet, the blanket, federal-level
exemption based on gross revenue and radius of distance of sales72 is
insufficient to protect the smaller entities. The FSMA drastically
increases the powers of the FDA, shifting the locus of food safety
regulation to the federal realm of oversight: “[I]n practice, the [FSMA]
morphs cooperative federalism into a more centralized government.
What results is a lessening of state independence.”73 Congress has
68. The E. coli outbreak was traced to bagged Dole spinach processed at Natural
Selection Foods, LLC in San Juan Bautista, California. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, FDA Finalizes Report on 2006 Spinach Outbreak, (Mar. 23, 2007)
available at http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/2007/
ucm108873.htm. The Salinas Valley in California produces a majority of the fresh lettuce
consumed in the United States: “in 2007, [the Salinas Valley] produced 84% of the head
lettuce grown for U.S. consumption.” Johnson & Endres, supra note 2 at 52.
69. “Jalapeño peppers were traced back to distributors in the United States that received
produce grown and packed in Mexico.” CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
Investigation of Outbreak of Infections Caused by Salmonella Saintpaul, (Aug. 28, 2008),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ salmonella/saintpaul/jalapeno/.
70. Individuals associated with Peanut Corporation of America, the source of the
outbreak, have since been indicted. Kate Brumback, Feds Indict 4 In Peanut Butter
Salmonella Outbreak, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 21, 2013, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/21/feds-indict-4-peanut-butter-salmonellaoutbreak/?page=all (“The Department of Justice will not hesitate to pursue any person whose
criminal conduct risks the safety of Americans who have done nothing more than eat a peanut
butter and jelly sandwich.”).
71. Representative Rosa DeLauro, who introduced the initial bill to Congress, stated
“[t]he intent of the bill is to focus on the large, industrial processes such as the peanut
processing plant in Georgia that was responsible for the salmonella outbreak that killed nine
people.” Ryan Grim, HR 875 Myth Sows Terror Among Organic Gardeners, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (May 10, 2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/09/hr875-myth-sows-terror-a_n_185230.html.
72. A farm is exempt from, for instance, full implementation of compliance measures in
accordance with rules promulgated under the Standards for Produce Safety during any
calendar year where more than fifty percent of the farm’s produce is sold directly to qualified
end users for the previous three years and the average gross revenue stemming from all food
sold during that same period was less than $500,000.00. 21 U.S.C. § 350h(f) (2006). There is
a nearly identical exemption to rules promulgated under the Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based
Preventive Controls (known as HACCP) portion of the Food Safety Modernization Act,
although such exemption is further qualified. 21 U.S.C. § 350g (2006).
73. Emily Walters, The Food Safety Modernization Act’s True Implications for
Sustainable Agriculture, 4 WASH. & LEE ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV’T. 391, 396 (2013). Of
course, advocating for state independence in such matters does not preclude the potential
downside that states will not rise to the occasion, eschewing the cost of developing programs
closely tailored to their agricultural sector. In such an event, the FSMA could provide a
satisfactory or workable plan to serve sufficiently.
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generally framed food production in terms of economics “rather than one
with broader health and cultural implications.”74 The FSMA, as written,
only further aligns federal policy with this historical rut.
B. The Food Safety Modernization Act: Regulation in Depth and
Breadth
The FDA now oversees and regulates approximately eighty percent
of the nation’s food supply.75 Most of the expansive reach of the FSMA
is beyond the scope of this Note; instead, the focus here is on two
particular sections of the law, both of which will directly regulate
farmers and agriculture. In particular, new regulatory power is created
in the FDA to create and implement food safety measures for vegetable
and fruit farms76 and to mandate Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Points (HACCPs) for all non-meat food processing facilities.77 Congress
was motivated in particular by recent illnesses and deaths caused by
foodborne contamination; in this sense, passage of the FSMA was
reactive.78 The general intent of the FSMA, however, is to realign the
FDA’s powers to create a more preventive approach to food safety, as
opposed to a historically reactive approach.79

74. Johnson & Endres, supra note 2, at 68.
75. Strauss, supra note 10, at 354.
76. 21 U.S.C. § 350h (2006).
77. 21 U.S.C. § 350g (2006). The USDA, which oversees the safety of meat and
poultry, instituted HACCP measures for meat and poultry processors in the late 1990s, with
costs of compliance arguably contributing to the loss of small slaughterhouses and the
centralization and industrialization of larger meat processing facilities thereafter. “One
problem developing for the last thirty years . . . is the consolidation of meat processors and
therefore USDA-approved inspection sites . . . [s]ince 1981, the number of slaughterhouses
and . . . inspectors have each declined by 10%. During the same period, however, meat and
poultry production doubled.” Anderson, supra note 13, at 154. A study by Michael Ollinger
and Danna Moore examined the ability to absorb costs of compliance with HACCP-type
regulations in the meat processing industry: “large plants may have lower per-unit regulatory
costs because they can spread fixed regulatory costs over more volume . . . . ‘Economies of
scale in food-safety process control give the very largest plants a substantial cost advantage
over their smaller competitors.’”) Anderson, supra note 13, at 161-62 (quoting Michael
Ollinger & Danna L. Moore, The Direct and Indirect Costs of Food-Safety Regulation, 31
REV. AGRIC. ECON 247 (2009)).
78. Sarah K. Baker, The Food Safety Modernization Act: Keeping Dinner Safe and
Farmers in the Fields, 3 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 247, 253 (2011)
(citing the public reaction to the 2009 salmonella outbreak linked to peanut butter as setting
the stage for the FSMA).
79. “Developing and implementing the new prevention standards mandated by
Congress is the FDA’s most critical activity in the initial phase of its implementation of
FSMA . . . [it] requires a sea change in the standards . . . for assuring safe food production.”
Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Report to Congress on Building
Domestic Capacity to Implement the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) 6 (2013),
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While most consumers laud the objective of making food safe for
consumption,80 there are questions about the efficacy of such expansive
preventive regulation.81 Additionally, the implementation of expanded
inspection power will require immense amounts of funding.82 Initially,
and still, small and mid-sized farmers and producers have decried the
attempts at blanket regulation of agriculture.83 The Tester-Hagan
Amendment was adopted as a means to create a scalable system, one in
which the small producers were not excessively burdened by regulatory
schema aimed at industrial agriculture.84
A closer look at the Tester-Hagan Amendment betrays its futility in
achieving the goal of preserving small, owner-operated farms. The
Amendment places the burden of proof of exemption on the agricultural
entity; additionally, to qualify, the entity must prove multiple elements
with documented evidence based on several years’ worth of records.85
Exemption from one regulation does not necessarily imply exemption
from the other; for instance, those entities that are fully exempt from the
Produce Rule may still be subject to the Hazard Prevention Rule. In any
event, most producers will not achieve a full exemption and will instead
need to fulfill various compliance requirements.86 For example:
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/
UCM351876.pdf.
80. Strauss, supra note 10, at 357.
81. Baylen J. Linnekin, The Food Safety Fallacy: More Regulation Doesn’t Necessarily
Make Food Safer, 4 NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL, 89, 91 (2012) (“In
hindsight, the FDA’s own record—and those of other federal agencies—shows that food—
safety regulations often rest on factually erroneous premises and, consequently, can
sometimes . . . make consumers less safe.”) (emphasis in original).
82. See Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Report to
Congress on Building Domestic Capacity to Implement the FDA Food Safety Modernization
Act (FSMA) 59 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/
GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/UCM351876.pdf. (“FSMA places broad new demands on
FDA . . . FSMA cannot be fully implemented in a timely and effective manner without
additional resources.”) The FSMA’s grant of extensive inspection authority is, however,
beyond the scope of this note.
83. See Richie Davis, Valley Farms Again Decry Food-Safety Rules They Call Onerous,
Unnecessary, DAILY HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE (Northampton, Mass.), Aug. 24, 2013, available
at http://www.gazettenet.com/home/819689-95/valley-farmers-again-decry-food-safety-rulesthey-call-onerous-unnecessary.
84. See Baker, supra note 78, at 259.
85. See 21 U.S.C. 350h(f)(1) (2006): “A farm shall be exempt . . . if . . . during the
previous 3-year period, the average annual monetary value of the food sold by such farm
directly to qualified end users during such period exceeded the average annual monetary value
of the food sold by such farm to all other buyers . . . and . . . the average annual monetary
value of all food sold during such period was less than $500,000.00.” (emphasis added).
86. See generally NEW ENGLAND FARMERS UNION, The Food Safety Modernization
Act: What Do the New Laws Mean for Small Farms and Food Producers?, (last visited May
22, 2015), available at http://www.newenglandfarmersunion.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/FoodSafety.pdf.
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If a farm processes or manufactures food products and sells less than
half of its products to individual consumers but more than half to a
combination of those customers, local restaurants and stores, and the
gross sales are less than $500,000, the farm is still required to
register with the FDA under the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 . . . The
farm operators also must also demonstrate that they have identified
potential hazards and are implementing preventive controls, OR
demonstrate to FDA that they are in compliance with state or local
87
food safety laws.

In short, even those farms or producers with qualified exemptions
will be subject to compliance mechanisms, which will likely be
duplicative in light of state and local policies, as well as consumerdriven food safety policies.88
C. Agriculture in New England: Moving Toward a Sustainable, SelfReliant Region.
Agriculture in New England is undeniably shaped by seasonal
realities which lengthen or shorten growing seasons, more so than in
some other regions.89 Farmers and producers in New England must
contend with seasonal oddities, such as a recent freeze that destroyed
most of the annual apple crop.90 Because of unpredictable weather
events, annual gross income has an ability to fluctuate significantly: for
instance, an orchard that loses most of its crop one year may have a
successful season the next.91 Many farms and food producers will likely
find the $500,000.00 average revenue cap element of the exemption
unrealistic because of seasonal fluctuations.
Because of the foregoing realities, many farms in New England
choose to diversify their crops and additionally sell value-added items to

87. Id.
88. Many New England farms have already adopted safety policies; many are driven by
consumer demand. See, e.g., Gemme, supra note 7. (“As a vegetable grower in the
Connecticut River valley, I have been involved in a customer-required food safety audit
program on my farm for the past three years . . . . This now takes about four hours a day.”).
89. Abigail Curtis, Apple Growers Struggling With Tough Season, BANGOR DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 9, 2012, http://bangordailynews.com/2012/09/08/business/apple-growersstruggling-with-tough-season/. Unseasonable weather events are becoming more frequent,
possibly as a result of climate change: “We’re definitely running into a pattern of earlier hot
spells and very erratic weather . . . . It’s not the real normal kind of patterns that we’re used to,
or the trees are used to. It’s a real indication that things are changing.” Crop failure, while
common, could make or break the gross sales revenue facet of the exemption requirement – by
setting the cap for exemption at $500,000 gross sales revenue from sales of food, the FSMA
fails in its sensitivity thereto.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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bolster their profits.92 By diversifying produce and selling value-added
products—such as pickles, frozen vegetables, or jam—farmers are able
to increase their sources of revenue and capitalize on the value that some
degree of processing can impart.93 Under the FSMA, however, farms
and producers must be very careful if they wish to work around the “trip
wires” that will cause them to fall outside of the exemption. Virginia
Nickerson of the University of Vermont’s Center for Sustainable
Agriculture commented on the difficulty of utilizing these strategies for
generating income under the FSMA:
[W]e’ve been encouraging farms to diversify, to process some of
their products and to create value-added products. And when farms
do that, depending upon gross sales levels, that may put a lot of
farms into the preventative controls category, and if that happens,
that’s going to mean they’re going to have a lot more record keeping.
94
They might have to put in more infrastructure.

Some farms, who simply offer a modest roadside farmstand stocked
only with an occasional bumper crop of seasonal produce, may not
qualify for an exemption despite the fact that most of their income is
based in, for example, animal feed, such as silage or feed hay.95
Many diversified farms will not qualify for the exemption even
though their produce or value-added operations are relatively small.
They will be faced with two options: comply with the costs of
FSMA, or exit their produce or value-added operations (which often
provide an essential income diversification strategy). Both options
96
may well destroy the financial viability for these diversified farms.

92. NEW ENGLAND FARMERS UNION, FSMA and Structure of New England Agriculture
(last visited May 22, 2015), http://www.newenglandfarmersunion.org/food-safetymodernization-act/fsma-and-structure-of-new-england-agriculture/. (“New England, with its
preponderance of small but growing and diversified farms, will be disproportionately affected
by FSMA.”).
93. See Melissa Matthewson, Exploring Value Added Agriculture, OR. S. U. SMALL
FARM NEWS, Vol. II, No. 2, Summer 2007, available at
http://smallfarms.oregonstate.edu/sfn/su07valueadded (last visited May 22, 2015).
94. Bob Nuner, Battling the Goliath of Federal Regulations— Small Vermont Farms
and the Food Safety and Modernization Act, THE BRIDGE, Sept. 8, 2013,
http://www.montpelierbridge.com/2013/09/battling-the-goliath-of-federal-regulations-smallvermont-farms-and-the-food-safety-and-modernization-act/.
95. Rosemary Fifield, Food Safety Modernization Act in New England, CO-OP FOOD
STORES, Aug. 23, 2013, http://www.coopfoodstore.coop/news/food-safety-modernization-actnew-england (“‘Food sales’ include all food sold for human or animal consumption – hay,
milk, syrup, and produce . . . . If a farm’s gross food sales (of all farm or feed production)
exceed the limit OR if their direct sales just are a small portion of their total sales, a farm is
not exempt. Many diversified farms will not qualify for the exemption even though their
produce or value-added operations are relatively small.”).
96. NEW ENGLAND FARMERS UNION, supra note 92.
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New England is also known for a recent growth spurt in its
sustainable and organic farming practices.97 Market demand for
sustainably grown and organic produce and other food has created a
massive influx of new and old farms embracing the practices.98 These
methods, however, are often costly to implement and may require
additional certification.99 Organic certification is time consuming,
costly, and requires a heft of administrative tasks in addition to the costly
practices.100
Because sustainable and organic agriculture often costs more in
terms of startup and continuing production, those farmers must, in turn,
charge more to recoup these expenses.101
An example of an
environmental enhancement cost not captured by conventional farming
methods is the cost of maintaining buffer strips, also known as
conservation buffers—these areas of permanent vegetation prevent
various types of contamination.102 They prevent runoff and erosion,
increase biodiversity, and provide habitat.103
This singular example means that farmers utilizing this sustainable,
organic method cannot utilize every square inch of their arable land.
Thus, the prices of any resulting products tend to be higher, reflective of

97. NEW ENGLAND FARMERS UNION, See Number of Farms on Rise in New England,
http://www.newenglandfarmersunion.org/number-of-farms-on-the-rise-in-new-england/ (last
visited May 22, 2015); see also Steve Grant, Let it Grow: Connecticut Leads Farm Growth in
New England, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 23, 2014, http://articles.courant.com/2014-0323/news/hc-farm-survey-results-ct-20140322_1_new-farmers-agriculture-census-andy-billipp.
98. Jo Anne Shatkin, Financing a Growing Appetite for Sustainable Food,
CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION BLOG (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.clf.org/blog/clfventures/financing-a-growing-appetite-for-sustainable-food/.
99. The high purchase cost of organic foods and produce more accurately reflect the
true growing and processing costs than other products because organic producers “substitut[e]
labor and intensive management for chemicals, the health and environmental costs of which
are borne by society.” ORGANIC FARMING RESEARCH FOUNDATION, Organic FAQs: What is
organic farming?, http://ofrf.org/organic-faqs (last visited May 22, 2015).
100. For organic certification through an entity accredited by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, there is a three-year transitional period during which the land for which
certification is sought is free of non-organic amendments or inputs. The cost of certification
can range from a few hundred to several thousand dollars, depending on the size of the
operation. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., National Organic Program FAQ: Becoming a Certified
Operation (last modified Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/
ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateN&topNav=&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgra
m&page=NOPFAQsHowCertified&description=FAQ:%20%20Becoming%20a%20Certified
%20Operation.
101. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Organic Agriculture FAQ,
http://www.fao.org/organicag/oa-faq/oa-faq5/en/ (last visited May 22, 2015).
102. See generally, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION CENTER,
Buffer Strips: Common Sense Conservation, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/
national/newsroom/features/?cid=nrcs143_023568 (last visited May 22, 2015).
103. Id.

FISHER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

354

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

8/14/15 11:14 AM

[Vol. 37:337

the tradeoff for use of that portion of the land for agriculture.104 Based
on the growth and demand for locally-sourced, organic produce and
food, one can infer that consumers in New England are willing to, in
turn, pay more for the knowledge that the agricultural practices at hand
are environmentally friendly.105 By capping the gross revenue at
$500,000.00, the exemption would tend to offer a disincentive to the
sustainable, organic model.106 Because costs for organic and sustainable
production tend to be higher, gross revenue must also be higher to reflect
that difference.
Additionally, New England as a region boasts large price tags on
real estate—the high cost of land and living in New England is reflected
in the cost of farmland.107 Realistically, a New England farmer or
producer with a gross income of $500,000.00 may only have a net profit
of ten percent of that income, or $50,000.00.108 The FSMA’s exemption
provided by the Tester-Hagan Amendment “does not accommodate
differences in scale related to geography and market availability. A
small farm in California is a massive farm in New England, and
$200,000 worth of cabbage comes from a much different sized operation
104. “Prices of organic foods include not only the cost of the food production itself, but
also a range of other factors that are not captured in the price of conventional food, such as:
[e]nvironmental enhancement and protection (and avoidance of future expenses to mitigate
pollution). For example, higher prices of organic cash crops compensate for low financial
returns of rotation periods which are necessary to build soil fertility.” FOOD AND AGRIC.
ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 101.
105. See, e.g., FOREVER FARMLAND, http://foreverfarmland.org/ (last visited May 22,
2015) (dedicated to preserving agricultural parcels in western Massachusetts through
agricultural preservation restrictions); LAND FOR GOOD, http://www.landforgood.org (last
visited May 22, 2015) (“Entire communities will benefit from increased farming opportunity,
healthy lands and a more secure food supply.”); GROW FOOD NORTHAMPTON, Our Mission,
Goals, and Beliefs, http://www.growfoodnorthampton.com/about-us-2/our-mission/ (last
visited May 22, 2015).
106. “[S]etting a revenue ceiling for exemption from the FSMA’s costly compliance
requirements creates a disincentive for local direct-to-consumer producers to expand
production and may discourage new entrants in local farming.” Anderson, supra note 13, at
164.
107. “In the Northeast, which boasts 7 out of the 10 states with the most expensive
farmland, and particularly in tiny Rhode Island, farms cost more because land is scarce.”
Maya Roney, Green Acres, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK, (Apr. 11, 2007),
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-04-11/green-acresbusinessweek-business-newsstock-market-and-financial-advice.
108. “Costs will be significant for farmers of all sizes but most acutely felt by small and
mid-size growers – FDA’s numbers show that growers with sales up to $500,000 will spend 46% of their gross revenue to comply with proposed on-farm regulations. . . . The average net
income for farmers nationally was 10% of sales in 2011; so for small farms subject to the
rules, FSMA could consume more than half of those modest profits.” NATIONAL
SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COALITION, Top 10 Reasons for Farmers, Consumers, and
Organizations to Weigh in on Proposed Food Safety Rules, (Oct. 11, 2013)
http://sustainableagriculture.net/blog/food-safety-comments-top-10/. (emphasis added).

FISHER.DOCX(DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

8/14/15 11:14 AM

ALL (FOOD) POLITICS IS LOCAL

355

than $200,000 of artisanal cheese.”109 New England small-scale
agriculture is a prime example of how the FSMA will fail to achieve
effective, workable, scalable, and importantly, place-oriented regulation.
D. Falling Outside of the Exemption: Will Compliance Make our
Regional Food Supply Safer?
This section of the Note will examine how compliance with the
FSMA will hurt New England agriculture and, in effect, make our food
system more dependent on industrial agriculture, and thus less safe.
Additionally it will argue that local food is safer than product associated
with industrial agriculture.
Small and mid-sized New England farms that fall outside of the
scope of complete exemption will face many tough choices going
forward. Cost of compliance with the FSMA may force some small
farms out of business, and may still force others to lower the costs of
their agricultural practices—by, for example, utilizing cheaper synthetic
pesticides and herbicides in place of more labor-intensive sustainable
practices that cost more to implement.110
Assuming some farmers are able to bear the costs of compliance,
the result would not be that our regional food supply is made any
safer.111 The overwhelming majority of large-scale foodborne illnesses
can be traced back to industrial agriculture and its subsequent lengthy
supply chains and extensive handling of product.112 Conversely, for
small, local producers, any outbreaks of foodborne illness would be
much more limited in scope, both quantitatively and geographically.113
109. Obolensky, supra note 44, at 920 (internal citation omitted).
110. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 101 (explaining that
organic food is costlier because it requires “greater labour [sic] inputs per unit of output and
because greater diversity of enterprises means economies of scale cannot be achieved.”).
111. “There is no food safety issue on our small farms here in New England. Richard
Bonano, a vegetable specialist at the University of Massachusetts Extension, recently
wondered how we would measure the success of implementing a major food safety program
on New England farms, given that there is no problem in the first place.” Gemme, supra note
7.
112. Endres & Johnson, supra note 46, at 54 (“[T]he long transportation chains needed
to move fresh-cut greens from field to processing plant to retail outlets are an especially
important area of potential bacterial contamination.”).
113. “The argument typically goes like this: big food producers are the source of most
bacterial contamination because they grow vast amounts of raw agricultural commodities,
which are shipped to central processing plants, handled by many people, commingled with
other produce, and stripped of natural protective barriers . . . . They are then treated to
preserve shelf life and shipped thousands of miles away . . . . This long chain of processing
and supply introduces countless opportunities for contamination.” Johnson & Endres, supra
note 2, at 91. Unfortunately, there has been no extensive study empirically indicating the
inherent safety of locally-grown produce and locally-sourced products.
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Historical evidence illustrates the fact that high costs of compliance,
especially those associated with stringent preventive rules, tend to drive
smaller businesses out.114 For example, in the late 1990s, when the
USDA mandated HACCP-type rules for slaughterhouses and meat
processors, the result was that many smaller-scale slaughterhouses and
meat producers ceased to exist and the industry became further
industrialized and centralized.115 Larger, industrial facilities were able to
absorb the costs more readily.116
Even the FDA has predicted that the FSMA’s strict preventive
approach will have a similar effect on small agricultural entities.117 In
effect, the large industry players that are generally the sources of the
majority of the problems prompting the passage of the FSMA will be left
standing. Subsequently, some small entities, which were never the
source of the problem, may cease to exist.
II. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
There is no question that agriculture is a vast and diverse industry
with regional particularities involving various types of entities, practices,
crops, levels of on-farm diversification, costs of production and
overhead, and levels of owner involvement in production. Because these
facets consistently vary from state to state and region to region, serious
care should be taken to increase all stakeholder roles in repairing food
safety in the United States. Any federal food safety or agricultural
regulation should take especial care to preserve the identities and
functionality of small and mid-sized growers and producers.
Realistically, because agriculture is so diverse, as described above, even
the FDA has recognized this fact.118 Any type of blanket regulation
thereof will be inadequate, and no unilateral rules for exemption will
serve as an effective safety net for the small players in what is an
increasingly large-scale food system. Despite the well-intentioned

114. Anderson, supra note 13, at 161-62.
115. Obolensky, supra note 44, at 915-17.
116. Anderson, supra note 13, at 161-62.
117. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS – STANDARDS FOR
THE GROWING, HARVESTING, PACKING AND HOLDING OF PRODUCE FOR HUMAN
CONSUMPTION, 317 (2013), available at www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/
UCM334116.pdf.
118. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Guidance for Industry: Guide to
Minimize Microbial Food Safety Hazards for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables, 117 (Oct. 26,
1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/
GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/ProducePlanProducts/ucm065474.htm (noting, in
part, that agricultural practices and commodities differ vastly, and that food safety practices
should be tailored to each individual entity).
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Tester-Hagan Amendment, many small and mid-sized farmers and
producers across the nation will either fall outside of the exemption or
will be forced to significantly alter their business practices while
continuously taking great care to keep their revenue from sales of their
product beneath the gross revenue cap.
To the extent that we feel that the federal government should be
regulating food safety all the way back to the fields, such federal
regulation must somehow be reflective of the place-based identity
inherent in this industry.119 To that end, an examination of the historical
tenets of a cooperative federalism approach to implementation of federal
regulation at a state level reveals the ability of such an approach to
achieve the goal of protecting the individuality inherent in each state and
region’s agriculture.
An inquiry into the theories supporting cooperative federalism
highlights valid concerns for state sovereignty and regionalism in similar
scenarios. Historically, and recently, cooperative federalism has been
most often associated with the state implementation of environmental
laws, including pollution control and natural resource conservation.
An examination of the potentialities of such an approach in the
environmental law realm illustrates that justifications for such an
approach are appropriately translated and translatable to the regulation of
the food safety implications of agricultural practices.
The FSMA, as currently written, does not adequately address the
inherent certainty of state and regional agricultural variability; revisiting
the tenets of cooperative federalism as a means to increase state and
local tailoring and creative implementation of federal law may give rise
to a solution that better balances all of the interests at stake. At
minimum, each state should have the opportunity to shape the
implementation of such law to fit its own needs while also respecting the
intent of federal food safety legislation.
A. The Roots of Cooperative Federalism: Shared Power
Cooperative, or collaborative, federalism can be defined as the
sharing of responsibilities for given functions by the federal and state
governments. In this sense it is conceived to be the opposite of dual
federalism which implies a division of functions between

119. “[C]ommonalities in localities or regions form natural foodsheds. . . . The idea is
that a foodshed is embedded in a geographic region, and that this allows people to become
more concerned with their immediate environment and how food production affects it.”
Margaret Sova McCabe, Foodshed Foundations: Law’s Role in Shaping Our Food System’s
Future, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW REV. 563, 569-70 (2011).
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governments as well as a division of governmental structures . . . .
Even during the nineteenth century, when the ethos of the times
called forth a theory of dualism that was based on a functional
demarcation between governments, the actual exigencies of the
120
operation of the system of necessity demanded cooperation.

Cooperative federalism stems from the very “roots of federalism
itself” namely, “a federalist theory of government, a dual governmental
structure, some specific cooperative programs, and some administrative
techniques for intergovernmental collaboration.”121 The Constitution
“provides for dual institutions, some cooperative programs, and a wide
range of concurrent powers which can either be divided between the
federal government and the states or shared by them in various
cooperative programs.”122 Indeed, the Supreme Court has “characterized
our federalism as requiring that Congress treat the States in a manner
consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint
participants . . . federalism entails neither blind deference to States’
Rights nor centralization of control over every important issue in our
National Government and its courts.”123
Without delving into a lengthy examination of hundreds of years of
the historical development of American federalism, it is important to
note how a cooperative approach to implementation of federal policy has
been construed within the past century or so. Examining the initial
theories behind cooperative federalism sheds light on the way in which a
more cooperative approach to food safety could achieve the preservation
of federal and state (and, thereby, local) objectives and considerations.
This Note’s criticism of the FSMA centers around its insensitivity to
state and regional agricultural differences in its blanket regulation and
exemption provisions. Congress could “pursue its objectives without
running roughshod over state sovereignty [by] enlist[ing] the assistance
of state governments in the pursuit of federal goals and to allow the
states to pursue supplementary or alternative goals, as long as such state
efforts do not frustrate achievement of the federal purposes.”124
Although the FSMA directs the FDA to work with other federal agencies
and state actors to implement the eventual regulations, no real recourse is
120. Daniel J. Elazar, Federal-State Collaboration in the Nineteenth-Century United
States, in COOPERATION AND CONFLICT, READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, 107 (Daniel
J. Elazar et al., eds.,1969).
121. Id. at 85.
122. Id. at 85-86.
123. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 722 (2006) citing
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (internal formatting and citations removed).
124. Id. at 723.
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left to the states themselves to tailor regulations to fit each state’s
individual needs.
In 1938, an Iowa Law Review symposium examined and explained
the idea of cooperative legislation; the articles therein focused on the
relationship of state and federal regulatory authority, including
commentary on the national objective of providing safe food.125 An
entire article posited the “influence of federal legislation on state efforts
to engage in natural resource conservation and planning.”126 Overall, the
symposium pieces saw cooperative federalism as an experimental but
meaningful facet in what amounted to an ongoing effort to define
American federalism by parsing out various iterations of the scope of
state and federal regulatory power.127
The federal government has clear authority to regulate pollution
under the commerce clause128 and under its ability to manage federallyowned lands, including protection of those lands from damage by
adjacent properties.129 In the latter half of the twentieth century, the
predictions made in 1938 about the suitability of cooperative federalism
in addressing national issues such as environmental and natural
resources concerns came to fruition.
Beginning in the 1970s, environmental law and policy embraced a
cooperative approach to implementation of pollution control law through
the Clean Air Act130 and the Clean Water Act,131 among other
environmental and health-based statutes adopting a cooperative
approach.132
These federal enactments aimed at nationwide
environmental protection and pollution control “did not completely
divest states and localities of their preexisting regulatory authority.
Instead, many of the statutes . . . created cooperative partnerships

125. See generally Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459
(1938).
126. Glicksman, supra note 123 at 724, citing William E. Warne, The Drainage Basin
Studies: Cooperative Federalism in Practice, 23 IOWA L. REV. 565 (1938).
127. “‘[F]ederalism is still in flux . . . no balance has yet been struck between state and
nation.’ The same statement clearly still holds true.” Glicksman, supra note 123, at 719
(internal citations removed).
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also N.Y. v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167
(1992) (noting that, despite Congressional power to regulate private activity, in some
instances, Congress has offered States a choice to adopt regulations in accordance with federal
programs).
129. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
130. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-671q (2000).
131. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
132. Another ground for federal regulation regarding environmental pollutants stemmed
from the “inability of the states to provide effective constraints on transboundary pollution—
pollution with interstate or international effects.” Glicksman, supra note 123, at 735.
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between federal and state governments.”133
Both sets of regulations explicitly spell out the Congressional intent
that state and local governments retain a role in implementing rules and
regulations aimed at achieving the ends of a national policy.134 The
Clean Air Act promotes state programs designed to “prevent and control
air pollution” through federal funding.135 The Clean Water Act similarly
encourages federal financial assistance in state development of programs
to eliminate and control pollution in connection with water sources.136
In both cases, the federal government essentially remains
“unquestionably . . . in the driver’s seat” because the stringent floor
standards to which state programs must essentially conform their
programs remains under the Congressionally delegated regulatory
purview of the Environmental Protection Agency.137
The Clean Air Act gave states the ability to create and adopt state
implementation plans (SIPs)138 to achieve national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS).139 The EPA maintains the ability to promulgate
NAAQS at a federal level; these NAAQS create a “maximum
permissible concentration;” states are then allowed to create and
implement plans centered on the federal model.140 The Clean Water Act
similarly vests power in the EPA to promulgate technology-based
standards to control pollution point source discharges into waters of the
United States.141
Under this approach, one author has noted that there are two key
elements necessary to this type of cooperative federalism: “the fostering
of state administrative programs, and . . . the delegation of tailored
standard-setting.”142 The Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act are apt
demonstrations of the ability of the federal and state governments to
enter into cooperative agreements concerning regulatory realms where
specific input and output of identifiable substances into the environment
133. Id. at 728-29.
134. Id. at 738-39.
135. Id. at 738-39.
136. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000).
137. Glicksman, supra note 123, at 740.
138. “As the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress initially intended to afford each
state the liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its
particular situation.” Glicksman, supra note 123, at 741, citing Train v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975) (internal quotations removed).
139. Glicksman, supra note 123, at 740-41.
140. Id.
141. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2000).
142. Fischman, supra note 42, at 190 (“Both . . . elements operate under oversight by
the federal government. In practice, this oversight is generally less strict than legislation
suggests because of political considerations and fiscal limitations.”).
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facilitates permitting and enforcement schemes. Such constructions of
cooperative federal-state approaches are generally characterized by
federal funding (in whole or in part) of the state program, as well as a
federal allowance for some measure of state customization of substantive
standards.143 Such customization can be based on local, state, and
regional considerations144—such considerations as exist in the
agricultural industry.
Normally, however, because the scientific
inquiries behind the federal legislation are expensive, states are generally
unable or unwilling to pay for comparable studies to significantly tailor
the state’s version of the regulations in such schemes.145
While cooperative federalism is most frequently associated with
state implementation of such pollution control scenarios, other types of
cooperative agreements between federal and state agencies have arisen,
and have arguably been executed successfully.146 One author describes
cooperative federalism in both narrow and broad conceptions, stating
that most scholars only focus on environmental programs within the
“aegis of the EPA.”147 Through a deeper and broader understanding of
cooperative federalism—an understanding that makes room for many
forms of federal-state integration and coordination—we may glean a
solution to the problems inherent in blanket regulation of agriculture.
A broader conception of cooperative federalism may offer workable
solutions to the problems small and mid-sized farmers and producers are
facing under the FSMA. If we are to retain a conception of cooperative
federalism that only provides for state implementation of, as another
author put it, pollution control mechanisms “within the aegis of the
EPA,”148 the result is limiting. A broader conception of cooperative
federalism, combined with the tenets of state customization
accompanying the implementation of the Clean Water Act and the Clean
Air Act, offers a plausible framework in which the intent of the
legislation can be achieved without indiscriminately putting many
smaller entities out of business.

143. Fischman, supra note 42, at 192-93. This author additionally notes that despite
stringency floors set by federal agency, “cooperative federalism programs typically allow for
significant customization of standards. For instance, under the CWA, states have a great deal
of discretion in determining water quality standards by defining designated uses and their
applications to particular bodies of water.” Similarly, under the Clean Air Act, states have
“wide latitude to choose among air pollution abatement and reduction strategies.”
144. “[S]tates may tailor their standards to . . . economic and social priorities . . . [and]
must justify deviations from the elaborate federal models.” Fischman, supra note 42, at 193.
145. Id. at 193.
146. Id. at 194.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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As one author noted, “[f]ew scholars of cooperative federalism have
considered the broad conception [of cooperative federalism].”149
Additional instances of state-federal and regional coordination of
implementation of natural resources laws “distill[] principles that deepen
our understanding of cooperative federalism.”150 Federal oversight of
public lands is a prime example of this conception of cooperative
federalism that is much broader than the type exhibited in the pollution
control mechanisms.151 The Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1970s and
1980s152 gave rise to increased “willingness of the federal government to
work with states as well as an increased capacity of the states to offer
substantive expertise and clearly articulated policies supporting the rise
of this informal, administrative federalism.”153 Although these types of
cooperative agreements center on federal jurisdiction based in the
Constitution’s property clause,154 arguably, such ends could be reached
in any instance where the federal government has some jurisdiction in
which it may legislate.
A prime example of this broadened conception of cooperative
federalism is evinced in federal resource planning for federally-owned
multiple-use designated lands; the federal government in essence invites
the states to participate through a planning process wherein states may
assert their objectives and interests.155
A particular breed of this type of cooperative federalism is placebased collaboration.156 It is responsive to the specific needs of one
location as a type of “system of decision-making . . . that is unique to a
particular site or region.”157 Such collaborations grow out of a particular

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The Sagebrush Rebellion argued for increased state and private activity (including
mineral extraction and grazing) on large quantities of federally-owned lands in western states.
While the ends sought (mineral extraction, privatization) are often maligned, the Sagebrush
Rebellion did give rise to the broad conception of cooperative federalism noted herein. For
more information on the Sagebrush Rebellion, see generally R. MCGREGOR CAWLEY,
FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENT
POLITICS (1993).
153. Fischman, supra note 42, at 194 (“The[se] informal, ad-hoc, complex
arrangements facilitating greater state leverage over federal lands decisions remain intact
today.”).
154. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
155. Fischman, supra note 42, at 194; see generally, Richard H. Cowart & Sally K.
Fairfax, Public Lands Federalism: Judicial Theory and Administrative Reality, 15 ECOLOGY
L. Q. 375 (1988).
156. Fischman, supra note 42, at 196.
157. Id. at 196.
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circumstance, dispute, or regional consideration relevant to the locus.158
So-called place-based collaborations grow out of regional issues that
often cross statutory boundaries, such as watersheds (for example,
CALFED manages the Sacramento River Delta).159
Such management can be in the form of multi-party collaboration or
it can take the form of bilateral cooperation between the federal
government and a single state or tribe.160 While the management of, for
instance, the biodiversity and habitat of a watershed may seem
incongruous to an issue such as food safety, the basic facets giving rise
to such place-based collaboration are indeed analogous: regional
considerations, particular to a single locus, are often best addressed by a
variety of stakeholders in an effort that centers around the management
of the locus.
As with management and protection of a variety of endangered
species, habitats, and resource areas, agriculture varies drastically from
state to state and region to region. Each state and region’s identity is
shaped in part by the type of agricultural economy present. These
variations in agricultural identity suggest an approach that adopts some
of the intentions to allow a more localized approach to the issues, while
also maintaining the federal objectives of food safety. Various federalstate land use plans are able to maintain the dual objectives of meeting
the needs of local, state, and tribal concerns while also ensuring, for
instance, protection of a federally-designated endangered species.161
Such collaborations, however, must be authorized by Congress,162 which
would likely make the operation of the FSMA writ large, nationwide,
under such a system impracticable. However, the facets of such an
approach are important in understanding how considerations of placebased particularities may give rise to an implementation of the FSMA
that factors local concerns into the equation.
An additional example of the broader-based concept of cooperative
federalism is the type of agreement and process that exists under the
Federal Land Policy Management Act, which “requires the [Bureau of
Land Management] to coordinate with state and local governments in the
development of land use plans to the extent consistent with the laws
governing the administration of public lands and to consider input
concerning land use decisions from states (and other non-federal

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 196-97.
Id. at 197.
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7, 18-19 (1999).

FISHER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

364

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

8/14/15 11:14 AM

[Vol. 37:337

entities).”163
This type of approach encourages states and other stakeholders to
bring plans to the federal table, and in some cases, the federal statute
may give preference to consistency with a state or local plan. Such
“state favoritism in the federal process” induces states to pursue their
objectives and federal objectives contemporaneously, but the federal
scheme remains aimed toward respect and a degree of deference to the
state’s plan.164 Again, although the substantive law at issue (land use) is
not entirely congruous with food safety oversight, the intentions are
analogous: Congress can create a type of deference to state and regional
stakeholders, so long as the state’s proposed plans remain in line with
federal objectives.165 While this avenue is costly for states because
development and proposal of plans without a guarantee of federal
approval is a sketchy approach, it does allow for states to pursue a plan
tailored to their own interests.
An additional conception of cooperative federalism posits a system
in which state plans, policies, or standards are adopted in accordance
with federal procedures, and are then instituted by the federal
government;166 in such a scenario, the federal government is likely to
adopt the state position. This type of cooperative federalism has been
referred to by one author as federal deference to state process.167 The
same author utilizes, as an example of an effective institution of this
process, the Coastal Zone Management Act’s consistency criterion.168
Essentially, the federal government provides guidelines and offers
funding for states to utilize in order to design and implement a coastal
management plan; once the plan is approved by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, the federal government’s actions
within the jurisdiction allotted under the management plan must be in
conformity with the state’s plan.169 Once a state’s management plan is
approved, it has the right to insist that any federal action regarding the
subject matter of the plan fall into conformity with the state’s plan.170
163. Fischman, supra note 42, at 200 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (c) (2000) (internal
quotations omitted)).
164. Fischman, supra note 42, at 200-01.
165. For instance, the National Forest Roadless Rule provision for state participation in
planning requires that the petition contain commentary on seven separate categories of
relevant information, including proposed forest management effect on animals. See National
Forest Roadless Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,661-62. Such a burdensome approach may be an
“arduous requirement for the states.” Fischman, supra note 42, at 203.
166. Fischman, supra note 42, at 203.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 204 (referring to 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (c) (2000)).
169. Id. at 204-05.
170. Id. at 204.
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This mode of cooperative federalism is especially attractive because the
federal government is essentially bound by the state’s determinations.171
By examining a broad swathe of federal regulations falling under an
expanded conception of cooperative federalism (that is, beyond the
often-analyzed pollution control realm), various facets of a cooperative
approach to federal regulation seem workable. Viewing a variety of
cooperative approaches through the lens of food safety, one can see how
a creative combination of elements from each model could give rise to a
successful implementation of federal food safety regulation—an
implementation that would not be nearly as destructive to small and midsized owner-operated farms. The inherent local particularities of
agriculture call loudly for an approach with more sensitivity, despite the
criticisms of cooperative federalism schemes.
B. Cost, Competition, and Other Criticisms: Overcoming the Obstacles
Various criticisms of cooperative federalism have arisen, ranging
from complaints about the innate high cost of utilizing federal monies as
an inducement to prompt states or regions to act,172 to suppositions that
states will engage in a “race to the bottom” to attract stakeholders wary
of more than the minimal amount of federal regulation.173 As with any
scheme for implementation of regulation at any level, these criticisms
are met—and often satisfactorily—with justifications.
One such criticism of cooperative federalism in the pollution
control context is that states are unlikely to embark on research to
develop their own standards in light of well-funded and established
federal standards; the argument thus becomes that states are more likely
to simply accept the existence of federal standards as a whole.174 In the
pollution control context, “[o]ne possible explanation for the states’
failure to provide effective environmental regulation is their lack of
scientific expertise and their inability to provide the resources needed to
implement such regulation.”175 One author has commented on the
rationale behind simply adopting the federal standards with regard to air
pollution standards:
It makes no sense to ask every state, city, or town to measure the
level, size, and type of particulates in its air, determine their
171. Id. at 206.
172. As noted, the primary inducement to states in adopting federal policy is nearly
always the receipt of federal monies. Fischman, supra note 42, at 189 (“A carrot-and-stick
approach to inducements is fundamental to cooperative federalism under any conception.”).
173. Glicksman, supra note 123, at 736.
174. Id. at 733-34.
175. Id. at 733.
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connection to respiratory failure and other health problems, identify
the safe level of emissions, and design cost-effective policy
responses. . . . In addition, the core variables within these functions
176
do not vary spatially, and thus diversity claims hold little sway.

This criticism is centered upon two factors: the innate technical
intricacy of measuring and computing particulate levels and connecting
those levels with incidence of health problems, and, more importantly,
the minimal concern for regional particularities associated with the
problem to be regulated. Arguably, agriculture varies more spatially
than air pollution: more factors are at play, not just the emission of
dangerous particulate into the atmosphere.
The regional differences in agriculture are more readily prevalent
and tangible than the microscopic nature of most pollutants; additionally,
the effects on agriculture of federal regulation are, too, more directly
tangible than the often attenuated and difficult connection between air
pollution and specific instances of human illness.
Agriculture is a visible manifestation resulting in the production of
edibles vital to our survival. It is possible that states could conduct
comparatively low-cost assessments of the risk of various sizes of
agricultural entities, and tailor regulations to meet the needs and inherent
risks of each sized entities. While microbial pathogens and bacteria, like
the microscopic particulates associated with air pollution, require some
degree of technical inquiry, constituents may feel more motivated to
promote expenditures related to consumer safety. As previously noted,
consumer outrage is what initially propelled the FSMA into existence.177
Perhaps consumers feel more concern about the safety of the food they
ingest than they do about expenditures relating to regulation of
something as frequently indiscernible as pollution.
An additional criticism of cooperative federalism is the theory that,
in the absence of strict federal standards, states will engage in a “race to
the bottom” to “attract new business by adopting increasingly lenient
controls on activities.”178
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or
community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high
environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry and
obstacles to economic development for fear that the resulting
environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of capital

176. Id. at 733-34 (citing Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570, 614 (1996) (emphasis added)).
177. See supra note 10.
178. Glicksman, supra note 123, at 736.
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179

to other areas with lower standards.

The “race to the bottom” theory has been roundly criticized; noted
in Part I.C, infra, consumers, especially in New England, are striving to
become more connected with the sources of their food. As such,
consumer awareness of food safety mandates is growing.180 This author
does not suggest an absence of food safety regulation; instead,
workability and scalability is key. In the “race to the bottom” theory, the
industry actors are posited as malevolent, and looking to decrease
costs.181 Simply put, small and mid-sized farmers are not looking to
evade food safety, but rather to make food safety workable for all sizes
of entities. Because of the more direct accountability associated with
small and mid-sized, owner-operated farms,182 evading food safety is not
a goal as it would tend to dissuade consumers.183 Quite simply, such a
criticism can be easily rebutted: although this “race to the bottom”
theory may (or may not) be an apt criticism of pollution regulation,184
direct consumer demand for food safety would drive good faith efforts to
produce safe foods in the realm of small and mid-sized, owner-operated
farms.
C. Where Can the FSMA Go from Here?
The FSMA, as written, makes only superficial efforts in promoting
state and local interests. This involvement is limited to training and
instruction in accordance with what will likely eventually be blanket
FDA regulations.185 In any event, the Tester-Hagan Amendment to the
179. Id. (citing Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212
(1977).
180. Nathan M. Trexler, Comment, “Market” Regulation: Confronting Industrial
Agriculture’s Food Safety Failures, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 311, 319 (2011).
181. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Raceto-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210,
1243 (1992).
182. O’REILLY, supra note 27, at 113 (“food is produced more carefully by actual
farmers—persons who either sell at a farmer’s market or whose identities are known to repeat
customers in the local community”).
183. Nathan M. Trexler, Comment, “Market” Regulation: Confronting Industrial
Agriculture’s Food Safety Failures, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 311, 337 (2011) (noting that
consumers have looked to local food as a means of protecting themselves).
184. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210 (1992).
185. “Examples of current ongoing activities include efforts to standardize training and
expertise levels of inspectors. Another example of integration is the effort to develop national
standards for federal, state, and local laboratories.” U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
Food Safety Modernization Act, Frequently Asked Questions, (last updated Sept. 19, 2014),
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FSMA reflects a federal urge to understand and regulate the agricultural
industry based on gross revenue—a facet of agriculture that, as
illustrated, varies remarkably from state to state and region to region.
The element of the Tester-Hagan amendment capping the exemption at
$500,000 betrays this federal failure to consider regional diversity.
Agriculture is a vast and diverse industry. In New England,
perhaps moreso than elsewhere, small, sustainable, owner-operated
farms are on the rise.186 The FSMA was initially explicitly aimed at
regulation of corporate bad actors.187 The Tester-Hagan Amendment
attempts to, but does not adequately, protect smaller entities.
Because states are more likely to have the best connection and
understanding of their own agricultural economies, each state should
receive some amount of discretion in its implementation of food safety
laws. While food safety is a national issue, protecting small entities
cannot easily be achieved by unilateral effort on the federal level. Each
state should, at the very least, be able to create its own exemption criteria
for small and mid-sized farmers and producers. Risk assessment of
entities, performed by state agencies, could analyze and respond to
varying levels of risk inherent in different types of facilities and farms.
By creatively drawing on facets from various models of cooperative
federalism, Congress and state legislatures could create more protection
for the smaller players.
For instance, a federal baseline requiring some form of preventive
controls could be set, giving states the opportunity to expand and
creatively implement programs centered on the federal policy. Looking
into broader conceptions of cooperative federalism, portions of placebased collaboration (namely, attention paid to locus-centered
considerations and local management plans) could be easily translatable
to addressing the regional diversity of agriculture.
Additionally, states could pursue and propose their own plans under
federal policy objectives, to be approved and adopted by the FDA. As
long as the essence of the food safety plans centers on the policy
objectives, it should square with the federal policy of preventive

available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm247559.htm. These
efforts show partnership in the form of uniform implementation—not eliciting statutory
considerations in shaping the new regulations to be responsive to regional concerns.
186. See Number of Farms on Rise in New England,
http://www.newenglandfarmersunion.org/number-of-farms-on-the-rise-in-new-england/ (last
visited May 22, 2015); see also Steve Grant, Let it Grow: Connecticut Leads Farm Growth in
New England, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 23, 2014, http://articles.courant.com/2014-0323/news/hc-farm-survey-results-ct-20140322_1_new-farmers-agriculture-census-andy-billipp.
187. Endres & Johnson, supra note 46, at 40.
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approach. At very least, states should have the ability to assess their
own criteria for exemption (in part or in whole) or variances from
compliance with costly measures.
In essence, each state would become a laboratory of democracy,188
creatively implementing important policy objectives while still retaining
a basic goal of preventive food safety strategy. Retaining small,
sustainable agricultural entities is and should be treated as equally
important as pursuing heightened food safety regulations.
CONCLUSION
The FSMA is an important piece of legislation, and its goals have
become important to consumers, especially in light of unacceptable
outbreaks of foodborne illness.189 The Tester-Hagan Amendment to the
FSMA is laudable in its concern for protection of small agricultural
entities; however, because of regional considerations, and the inherent
diversity of agriculture, the exemption provided by the amendment is
simply unworkable on a national scale.
In particular, New England will likely suffer a disparate impact.
Arguably, New England’s agricultural economy is rich, distinct, and
beneficial—and it is growing.190 The exemption framework will, in all
likelihood, cause a net loss of small agricultural entities and will hinder
growth and new entry of farmers into the industry. A creative solution
must be embraced; exploring various permutations of cooperative
federalism illustrates the possibility of tailoring food safety policy to
create a better fit for each state and region.
While federal delegation of the ability to create exemption and
variance frameworks will not solve all of the problems of our federal
agricultural regulations, it would be an important first step in increased
sensitivity to regional concerns, and indeed a first step in approaching
regulation of agriculture holistically.
Laura Fisher*

188. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
189. See NAT’L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COALITION, supra note 12.
190. See supra note 92.
* J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2015. I dedicate this Note to
my late grandfather, Ted Sparko, with whom I spent my childhood on our family farm. He
taught me life's most important lessons, including "everything that grows is beautiful." My
sincerest gratitude to my family and friends for their ongoing support. And a special thanks to
Jeff, whose patience never wavered.

